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Abstract 
Theories of attention to emotional information suggest that attentional processes prioritize 
threatening information.  Here, we suggest that attention will prioritize the events that are most 
instrumental to a goal in a given context, which in threatening situations typically is reaching 
safety.  To test our hypotheses, we used an attentional cueing paradigm that contained cues sig-
naling imminent threat (i.e., aversive noises) as well as cues that allowed to avoid threat (instru-
mental safety signals).  Correct reactions to instrumental safety signals seemingly allowed partic-
ipants to lower the presentation rate of the threat.  Experiment 1 demonstrates that attention pri-
oritizes instrumental safety signals over threat signals.  Experiment 2 replicates this finding and 
additionally compares instrumental safety signals to other action-relevant signals controlling for 
action relevance as cause of the effects.  Experiment 3 demonstrates that when actions towards 
threat signals permit to avoid threat, attention prioritizes threat signals. Taken together, these re-
sults support the view that instrumentality for reaching safety determines the allocation of atten-
tion under threat.  
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Humans are well prepared to respond to threat.  When encountering threat, several psy-
cho-physiological systems enable defensive actions, leading to elevated heart, pulse, and respira-
tion rate (Cannon, 1929; Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000), and coordinated activation in various 
cortical and subcortical parts of the brain (Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001; LeDoux, 1996).  
In line with these findings, attentional processes prioritize threat-related information in fear 
(Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009).  It is commonly assumed that the threat value of a stimulus is the 
key factor in causing such prioritized attention to threat (e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 2001; 
Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009).  In the present paper, however, we propose that, under threat, at-
tention is guided by the relevance of information for reaching safety.  
We assume that two classes of events are important when aiming to reach safety from 
danger (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Kruglanski et al., 2002).  First, the threat itself:  Monitoring 
of threat is functional for reaching safety because it allows observers to select and execute ap-
propriate defensive reactions (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997).  Crucially, we suggest that at-
tentional sensitivity is not limited to signals of threat but will comprise a second class of events, 
that is, non-threatening events that provide the potential to reach safety.  In most threatening sit-
uations it is important to identify and make use of means permitting to fight or flight such as po-
tential weapons or an escape route.  We ask how attention is allocated when both threat and safe-
ty signals compete for attentional priority. 
Previous research suggests that attention will mostly prioritize processing of threat itself.  
Research comparing signals of threat to stimuli that signal the absence of threat has shown pri-
oritization of threat (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & 
De Houwer, 2004).  Importantly, in these studies cues signaling the non-occurrence of threat 
have no instrumental value as they do not offer the potential to fight or escape threat whereas in 
real life such stimuli (weapons or an escape route) are often present.  Monitoring non-
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instrumental safety signals does not appear useful because they do not represent potential means 
that are helpful in overcoming threat.  Supporting this reasoning, in contexts where safety can be 
reached, attention to more instrumental safety signals is amplified:  Spider phobics who were in a 
room with a spider split attention between the spider and the door of the room (Thorpe & 
Salkovskis, 1998).   
Based on this observation, we propose that the attentional inferiority of safety signals is 
not unconditional but depends on the instrumentality of safety signals for reaching safety.  This 
is in line with models of attention describing the function of attention as the selection of infor-
mation that is instrumental for achieving a goal (Allport, 1998; Lewin, 1926; Moskowitz, Li, & 
Kirk, 2004) which in fear is reaching safety (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994).  Supporting this 
assumption, several studies have shown that goal-relevant events attract attention automatically 
even when they have no history of motivational relevance to the observer such as neutral stimuli 
that are relevant for a current goal induced in the experimental session (e.g., Moskowitz, 2002; 
Vogt, De Houwer, Van Damme, & Crombez, 2013).  Crucially, more instrumental stimuli re-
ceive attentional priority over less instrumental stimuli (Vogt, De Houwer, & Crombez, 2011; 
Vogt, De Houwer, & Moors, 2011).  For instance, when the goal is to win as much tokens as 
possible, stimuli relevant to winning a high number of tokens attract attention over stimuli that 
are relevant to winning a low number of tokens (Vogt, De Houwer, & Crombez, 2011).  From 
this perspective, attention should prioritize safety signals that are instrumental in reaching safety, 
for example, representing weapons to fight threat, over stimuli that are less instrumental for 
reaching safety.   
Importantly, in some situations, monitoring threat will be more instrumental for reaching 
safety than monitoring potential weapons or escape routes.  This will depend on the required or 
chosen strategy to achieve safety (cf. Notebaert, Crombez, Vogt, De Houwer, Van Damme, & 
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Theeuwes, 2011; Cesario, Plaks, Hagiwara, Navarrete, & Higgins, 2010).  For instance, when 
having to monitor the movements of a threatening animal in order to attack it successfully, threat 
should be prioritized by the attentional system.  We therefore expect that attention allocation var-
ies depending on whether monitoring threat or safety stimuli is more instrumental for reaching 
safety (cf. Vogt & De Houwer, 2014).  Such a pattern of data would support the proposal that the 
motivation to reach safety guides attention under threat and not a heightened ability to detect 
threat or safety information per se.   
In Experiment 1, we compared signals of threat to two types of safety signals: First, 
safety signals that only indicated the absence of threat (i.e., CS-; cf. Christianson et al., 2012) 
and, second, safety signals that were instrumental in reaching safety.  These instrumental safety 
signals required actions that (seemingly) allowed participants to avoid the threat.  We 
hypothesized that attention would prioritize instrumental safety signals over non-instrumental 
safety and threat signals.  This would support our suggestion that the instrumentality of 
information and not threat value or positive associations (i.e., absence of threat) determine the 
focus of attention.  In Experiment 2, we compared instrumental safety signals to signals that also 
required action but without leading to any beneficial consequences for participants’ safety.  This 
allowed us to control whether the functional value of the safety signals - as a means to fight 
threat - caused the effects rather than the fact that they were linked to a motor action.  If action 
relevance would underlie the effects, attention should not differentiate between these signals.  
This would be reflected in the absence of a systematic and significant pattern of attention 
allocation to one of the cues.  Further, if the instrumentality for reaching safety and not a unique 
feature of instrumental safety signals is driving attention then ‘instrumental’ threat signals should 
be prioritized as well.  To test this assumption, only actions towards the threat signal (seemingly) 
allowed participants to reach safety in Experiment 3 turning threat signals into the signal that is 
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most instrumental in reaching safety. 
In order to create a signal of imminent threat and a safety signal in the laboratory, we 
combined an attention task with a secondary task.  In each trial of this task, a single colored 
patch appeared briefly in the middle of the screen.  One color was occasionally followed by an 
aversive noise turning patches of this color into a signal of imminent threat (Koster et al., 2004; 
Notebaert, Crombez, Van Damme, De Houwer, Theeuwes, 2011).  A patch in another color was 
turned into an instrumental safety signal which presumably permitted avoiding threat over the 
course of the experiment.  To this end, we informed participants that correct reactions to this 
patch (i.e., pressing a particular key) would lead to less presentations of the aversive noise over 
the course of the experiment.
 
 We did not present aversive noises on trials with this color patch 
(e.g. that could be stopped on that trial by motor reactions, cf. Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  By 
this, the color patch would only represent a means to avoid threat but would not signal threat 
itself.  In Experiment 3, we informed participants that correct reactions to the threat patch would 
allow them to lower the number of presentations of the noise over the course of the experiment.  
Additionally, in Experiments 1 and 3, another colored patch represented a non-instrumental 
safety signal (CS-) that indicated the absence of threat.  In Experiments 2 and 3, a third colored 
patch served as action signal requiring a motor reaction but without leading to any beneficial 
consequences.  
To examine attention to the different signals, we implemented them as cues in a cueing 
paradigm.  In each trial of the cueing task, two cues are simultaneously presented at two different 
spatial locations on the screen, immediately followed by a probe.  If individuals selectively orient 
to a cue, responses are faster to probes at the location previously occupied by this stimulus.  In 
order to investigate whether both threat and safety cues attract attention over non-instrumental 
safety cues, we employed trials comparing threat cues to non-instrumental safety cues and trials 
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comparing instrumental safety to non-instrumental safety cues.  Importantly, we also employed 
trials presenting instrumental safety cues together with threat cues.  These trials allowed us to 
examine whether attention would prioritize instrumental safety cues over threat cues.  In 
Experiments 2 and 3, we additionally compared instrumental safety and threat cues to cues that 
required a motor action in the secondary task.  By comparing these cues to each other we could 
examine whether attention prioritizes cues that are instrumental in reaching safety over non-
instrumental action signals.  
We presented the cues for 200 ms cue presentation. This allowed us to measure 
attentional processing at a relatively early time because most emotional attention research uses 
presentation times around 500 ms or longer (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. 
Nineteen volunteers (7 men; M = 25 years; SD = 10 years) at the University of Reading 
participated in the experiment and received £5 as compensation.  All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the purpose of the experiment.  The study was 
approved to be in line with the guidelines of the University of Reading Research Ethics (Protocol 
2013-173-JV).  The sample size for all three experiments was determined based on a previous 
experiment that also involved fear-conditioned threat stimuli and goal-relevant stimuli 
(Experiment 3 in Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013).  The design of the present 
experiments was based on this experiment.  Because the crucial comparison in the present 
experiments is the comparison between cues that are instrumental for the goal of reaching safety 
and threatening cues, we referred to the effect size of the comparison between cues relevant for 
participants’ goal and threatening cues. Based on this effect size (d = 0.83), we calculated that 
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the minimum sample size should be 16 at an alpha of 0.05 and a power of 0.85.  
Apparatus and Materials. 
We presented the experiment on an Intel Core 2 computer with a 75 Hz, 17-inch LDT 
monitor using Inquisit 3.0 (2010) software.  As threat, safety, and non-instrumental safety 
signals, we used colored patches in yellow, orange, and pink.  Colors were matched for 
luminance using ImageJ (2011).  We counterbalanced the distribution of colors to patch 
functions between subjects.  Additionally, seven colored patches and 11 neutral pictures from the 
International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) were used in the 
secondary task as filler stimuli.  The colors were three shades of green, two shades of brown and 
two shades of grey.  The IAPS numbers were:  7002, 7006, 7009, 7090, 7140, 7150, 7175, 7211, 
7224, 7234, 7550.  The aversive noise was a 460-ms white-noise burst delivered through a head 
phone at an intensity of 95 dBA (Koster et al., 2004).   
Dot probe and secondary task. 
Each trial in the dot probe task started with the presentation of a black fixation cross (5 
mm high) in a white square in the middle of a black screen along with two white rectangles (4.6 
cm high x 6.1 cm wide) above and below the fixation cross (Figure 1).  The middle of each of the 
peripheral rectangles was 4.6 cm from the fixation cross.  After 500 ms, two colored patches 
were presented within the rectangles for 250 ms (cf. Koster et al., 2004).  A probe consisting of a 
black square (0.5 cm x 0.5 cm) appeared immediately after patch offset.  Participants were 
required to locate the probe by pressing one of two keys (“4”, “5” on the number pad) with index 
and middle finger of the right hand.  We counterbalanced the distribution of keys to probe 
locations between participants.  A trial ended after a response was registered or 1500 ms had 
elapsed since probe onset.  Each trial of the dot probe task was followed by a trial of the 
secondary task after an intertrial interval of 700 ms. 
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A trial in the secondary task started with the appearance of a colored patch or image in 
the middle of a black screen for 250 ms.  A red question mark (8 mm high) appeared hereafter.  
A trial ended with a response or when 2000 ms had elapsed since the onset of the question mark.  
On 50% of the trials with threat signals, we presented an aversive noise in parallel with the 
question mark.  After instrumental safety signals, participants had to press the spacebar with the 
left hand.  After all other signals, a reaction was not required.  Error feedback was presented for 
200 ms after incorrect reactions (i.e., no reaction) to the instrumental safety signal and incorrect 
reactions to the other stimuli (i.e., pressing of the spacebar); correct reactions to the safety signal 
were followed by a feedback screen stating ‘correct’. We did not provide feedback after correct 
reactions (i.e., non-reactions) to goal-irrelevant stimuli because it would have prolonged the 
duration of the experiment. Please note that experiments 2 and 3 compare and find differences 
between instrumental safety stimuli and control stimuli that are all followed by positive feedback 
after correct reactions. We can thus conclude that the feedback is not driving the effects for 
instrumental safety signals.   
Figure 1 about here 
Procedure. 
Practice phase. 
Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from a computer screen.  Instructions were 
presented on the screen.  Participants practiced at first only the dot probe task in two practice 
phases of 12 trials and 36 trials, respectively.  We asked participants to maintain attention at the 
fixation cross and to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to the probe location.   
Hereafter, participants practiced the secondary task.  At first, we informed them that one 
colored patch would sometimes be followed by an unpleasant noise which would never be 
presented after another stimulus.  Six practice trials followed this information.  We instructed 
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participants to find out which color would be followed by the aversive noise.  Participants were 
then informed that fewer noises would be presented over the course of the experiment if they 
press the spacebar each time one particular colored patch is presented.  The color was named and 
was always different from the color of the CS+ and the color of the CS-.  15 practice trials 
followed these instructions.  During these two practice phases, threat, safety, and non-
instrumental safety signals were presented five times; complemented by six filler trials.  On filler 
trials, we presented filler stimuli.  Hereafter, participants performed 24 practice trials of the 
combined procedure of dot probe and secondary task with 12 trials of each task.  In the dot probe 
task, each trial type (threat vs. non-instrumental safety, instrumental safety vs. non-instrumental 
safety, instrumental safety vs. threat) was presented four times.  In the secondary task, threat, 
safety, and non-instrumental safety signals were presented two times, complemented by six filler 
trials.  The aversive noise was presented once.  
Test phase. 
In the test phase, participants performed 144 trials of each task.  In the dot probe task, 
each of the three trial types was presented 48 times.  Each cue category was presented equally 
often in the upper and lower location and predicted the probe location correctly on 50% of the 
trials.  In the secondary task, each of the three signals was presented 24 times.  The aversive 
noise was presented on 12 trials with the threat signal.  The remaining 72 trials were filler trials.  
We included filler trials in order to prevent a high amount of presentations of the aversive noise 
which could have resulted in habituation.   
After the experiment, participants indicated to what extent they expected the presentation 
of a noise after the appearance of threat, safety, and non-instrumental safety signal (1 = never to 
7 = always), and how afraid they were during the presentation of threat, safety, and non-
instrumental safety color (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).  Further, they reported how 
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unpleasant (1 = not at all to 7 = very much), threatening (1 = not at all to 7 = very much), and 
controllable (1 = not at all to 7 = very much) they experienced the noise to be.  Additionally, they 
indicated how motivated they were to respond after the safety patch (1 = not at all to 9 = very 
much) and to which extent they had the impressions they could influence the presentation of the 
sound (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).  In order to have an indication of the sample’s trait 
anxiety levels, participants filled in the trait anxiety version of the State and Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI-Trait, Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) after finishing the 
tasks.  This questionnaire consists of 20 short items (e.g., “I feel secure”) which have to be rated 
on a four-point scale (1 = Almost never to 4 = Almost Always).  
Results 
We excluded the data of two participants from analyses:  Due to computer malfunction, 
one participant did not complete the entire set of trials in the test phase.  Including her data does 
not change the conclusions reported below.  The other participant indicated to have expected the 
presentation of the aversive noise more after non-instrumental safety signals (CS-) than after 
threat signals (CS+).  Actually, the CS- was never followed by the noise which was also 
highlighted in the instructions and repeated by the experimenter.  In contrast to the rest of the 
sample, his data showed an attentional bias towards non-instrumental safety signals on trials 
comparing them to threat signals. 
Manipulation checks and trait anxiety levels. 
 Participants described the noise as threatening (M = 5.12, SD = 1.45), unpleasant (M = 
6.06, SD = 1.03), and uncontrollable (M = 2.76, SD = 1.44).  They reported to have expected the 
presentation of the noise after the appearance of a threat patch (M = 5.47, SD = 1.07) but not af-
ter non-instrumental safety or instrumental safety patch (Mnon-instrumental safety = 1.29, SDnon-instrumental 
safety = 0.69; Minstrumental safety = 1.24, SDinstrumental safety = 0.97; ts (17) > 12.94, ps < .001); they re-
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ported that they were afraid during the presentation of the threat patch (M = 5.11, SD = 1.32) but 
not during the presentation of non-instrumental safety or instrumental safety patch (Mnon-instrumental 
safety = 1.29, SDnon-instrumental safety = 0.69; Minstrumental safety = 1.12, SDinstrumental safety = 0.33; ts (17) > 
10.15, ps < .001).  This indicates that conditioning was successful.  Expectancy and fear ratings 
did not differ significantly between non-instrumental and instrumental safety signals, ts (17) < 
1.15, ps > .268.  Finally, participants reported to have been very motivated to respond after the 
instrumental safety patch (M = 6.29, SD = 1.21).  At the end of the experimental session, partici-
pants did not have a strong impression that reactions to the instrumental safety signal allowed 
them to reduce the number of presentations of the aversive noise (M = 2.47, SD = 1.63). Howev-
er, given that participants made only very few errors (on 0.77% of trials) in the secondary task, it 
is clear they were motivated to perform this task and pursue the goal of avoiding threat.  The av-
erage STAI trait score was 42.53 (SD = 9.53) indicating regular trait anxiety levels (Spielberger 
et al., 1983). 
Dot probe task. 
 Trials with errors in the dot probe task were removed from the data (1.87%).  Following 
Ratcliff (1993), the medians of the reaction times were used for the analyses.
1
   
We performed three separate ANOVAs for each type of dot probe trial with congruence 
(congruent, incongruent) as within factor.  For trials with an instrumental safety signal, 
congruent trials are trials in which the probe replaced the safety signal (i.e., safety congruency), 
whereas incongruent trials are trials in which the probe replaced the comparison signal (i.e., 
threat or non-instrumental safety).  For the trials comparing threat and non-instrumental safety 
signals, congruent trials are trials in which the probe replaced the threat signal (threat 
congruence), whereas incongruent trials are trials in which the probe replaced the non-
instrumental safety signal.  Mean latencies and standard deviations of dot probe task responses 
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can be found in Table 1 and attentional bias scores per trial type and experiment in Figure 2.  We 
calculated Cohen’s d to see if the expected differences had small (.20), medium (.50) or large 
effect (.80) sizes (Cohen, 1992). 
Table 1 about here 
 The analysis on trials presenting threat with the non-instrumental safety signals revealed 
a significant main effect of threat congruence, F(1, 16) = 7.09, p = .017, d = 0.64, 95% CI [-0.05, 
1.33], demonstrating an attentional bias to threat signals compared to stimuli that signal the 
absence of threat.  On trials comparing instrumental safety to non-instrumental safety signals, we 
found a significant main effect of instrumentality congruence, F(1, 16) = 11.41, p = .004, d = 
0.82, 95% CI [0.12, 1.52], indicating attention allocation towards instrumental safety signals 
when compared to non-instrumental safety signals.  Of crucial importance were the trials 
comparing instrumental safety to threat signals.  These analyses showed a significant main effect 
of safety congruence, F(1, 16) = 14.96, p = .001, d = 0.93, 95% CI [0.22, 1.64].  Hence, attention 
was biased towards instrumental safety signals when these were simultaneously presented with 
threat signals. 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment revealed an attentional bias towards threat and safety cues 
when these stimuli were presented together with non-instrumental safety cues.  However, when 
instrumental safety and threat cues were presented together, attention was biased towards 
instrumental safety cues.  These results thus support our hypothesis that both threat and safety 
signals guide attention and that safety signals will be prioritized when they are more instrumental 
in reaching safety.  
In Experiment 2, we aimed to test whether instrumental safety cues will also be 
prioritized over safety-unrelated action cues.  Previous evidence has shown that action-relevant 
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signals guide attention (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002).  Hence, instrumental safety signals might 
have evoked an attentional bias because they were action relevant and not because they were 
functional for reaching safety.  To address this potential concern, participants had to give motor 
reactions also to non-instrumental safety cues in the secondary task but we did not say that these 
reactions would lower the presentations of the noise.  If action relevance would underlie the 
effects, no significant effect should emerge on those trials because both cues would attract 
attention.  In contrast, if instrumentality for reaching safety is guiding attention, instrumental 
safety cues should be prioritized over mere action signals.  
Experiment 2 
 Participants. 
A sample of 27 students (22 women; M = 20 years; SD = 2 years) at Ghent University 
received 7€ for participating in the experiment.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were naive as to the purpose of the experiment.  The study was approved by 
the ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology at Ghent University (2010/37, JV).  Data 
collection was scheduled for one week and finished by the end of this week. 
Apparatus, Materials, and Procedure.  
The experiment remained the same except for the following changes.  Importantly, we 
used again three color patches in the dot probe and in the secondary task. One color patch was 
associated with threat, one color patch served as instrumental safety cue, and one color served as 
non-instrumental action cue. After practicing the attention task, we told participants that after 
two of the colored patches they were required to press the spacebar with the left hand.  
Importantly, participants were informed that correctly reacting after one of these two colors (i.e. 
instrumental safety cue) would lead to less presentations of the noise over the course of the 
experiment.  To make sure that participants picked up this information, the program included two 
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questions (“Correct reactions after which color lead to less noises?” and “Which other color 
requires you to press the spacebar?”).  Participants had to type the name of a color in response to 
each question.  They received feedback on the screen whether they were correct.   
As before, participants learned which color was associated with aversive noises and they 
practiced the secondary task in two subsequent practice phases with 21 practice trials all 
together.  During these practice trials, the threat patch was presented six times and the 
instrumental safety and the mere action patch four times each, additionally there were seven 
filler trials.  The aversive noise followed the threat patch three times during the practice trials.   
After the task, participants were asked separately for the instrumental safety color and the 
mere action color how motivated they were to respond after each stimulus (1 = not at all to 7 = 
very much) and to what extent they had the impressions they could influence the presentation of 
the sound by reacting to it (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).  They were also asked to indicate 
which color instrumental safety and action signal have had. 
Results  
We excluded the data of one participant from the analyses because he indicated 
afterwards to have expected the presentation of the aversive noise more after the instrumental 
safety signal than after the threat signal.  Including his data did not change the conclusions 
reported in the following sections.  
Manipulation checks, trait anxiety levels, and secondary task. 
 Participants expected the presentation of the noise after threat signals (M = 5.12, SD = 
0.82) but not after safety or action signals (Msafety = 1.34, SDsafety = 0.75; Maction = 1.15, SDcontrol = 
0.46; ts(25) > 18.62, ps < .001).  They also reported to have been afraid during the presentation 
of threat signals (M = 4.00, SD = 1.72) but not during the presentation of safety and action sig-
nals (Msafety = 1.35, SDsafety = 0.75; Maction = 1.16, SDcontrol = 0.46; ts(25) > 8.57, ps < .001).  These 
ATTENTION FOR THREAT AND SAFETY CUES 
 
 
 
16 
ratings did not differ between instrumental safety and action signals, ts(25) < 1.55, ps > .133.  
Participants reported the noise to be threatening (M = 4.62, SD = 1.73), unpleasant (M = 5.58, SD 
= 1.36), and slightly uncontrollable (M = 3.61, SD = 1.75).  Further, participants reported to have 
been more motivated to respond after safety patches (M = 6.31, SD = 0.68) than after action 
patches (M = 4.92, SD = 1.23), t(25) = 6.04, p < .001, and they had the impression they could in-
fluence the presentation of the sound more by reactions to instrumental safety patches (M = 4.04, 
SD = 1.51) than to action patches (M = 1.88, SD = 1.03), t(25) = 5.87, p <  .001.  All participants 
reported the correct color to represent instrumental safety and action signals. 
In the secondary task, participants made errors on 3.22% of the trials.  Because partici-
pants did not make more errors (i.e., non-reactions) after the presentation of the mere action sig-
nal (M = 0.16%, SD = 0.82%) than after the presentation of the instrumental safety signal (M = 
0.48%, SD = 2.45%), t(25) = .625, p > .537, any differences in the attentional processing of these 
signals cannot be due to participants simply being less motivated to react to the mere action sig-
nal.  The average STAI trait score of this sample was 39.92 (SD = 10.31). 
Dot probe task. 
 The same analyses as for Experiment 1 were performed.  Mean latencies and standard 
deviations of dot probe task responses can be found in Table 1.  Trials with errors were removed 
(2.32%).  On trials comparing threat to mere action signals, we did not find a significant effect of 
congruence, F(1, 25) < 1, p = .384, d = 0.16, 95% CI [– 0.39, 0.70].  The analysis on trials with 
instrumental safety and threat signals revealed a significant main effect of safety congruence, 
F(1, 25) = 22.88, p < .001, d = 0.94, 95% CI [0.37, 1.51].  Crucially, also the trials comparing 
safety to mere action signals showed a significant main effect of safety congruence, F(1, 25) = 
37.44, p < .001, d = 1.20, 95% CI [0.61, 1.79].  Hence, attention was biased towards safety 
signals when these were simultaneously presented with either threat or action signals. 
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Figure 2 at about here 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment replicate the first experiment: Instrumental safety cues 
evoked an attentional bias over threat cues.  Importantly, attention also prioritized instrumental 
safety cues over mere action signals.  This shows that the functional value of safety signals - as a 
means to avoid threat – guides attention and not their action relevance.   
On trials comparing mere action signals to threat signals, no clear attentional pattern 
emerged but, if anything, attention seemed to lean towards action-relevant signals.  In previous 
studies, such action-relevant signals have been prioritized over threat (Vogt et al., 2013; Correll, 
Guillermo, & Vogt, 2014).  Crucially, in those studies, action signals were not competing with 
instrumental safety signals in the experimental context that provide more beneficial consequenc-
es for participants.  The relevance of action signals and their capacity to guide attention thus ap-
pears to depend on the context.  This means, when information is presented that is more benefi-
cial for participants it will probably lower the value of other less beneficiary information.  This is 
in line with research showing that attention to action-relevant signals is eliminated when signals 
that provide more beneficial consequences such as a higher reward are also present (Vogt, De 
Houwer, & Crombez, 2011).  
The findings raise the question of how attention is allocated when threat signals become 
more important than action signals.  In Experiment 1, threat signals were prioritized over non-
instrumental safety signals probably because monitoring threat signals permits to predict when to 
expect threat, thus being more instrumental in coping with threat.  In Experiment 3, we explored 
the possibility that when actions towards threat (seemingly) permit participants to avoid threat, 
threat signals will gain priority over action signals just as instrumental safety signals.  This 
would support our proposal that it is the instrumentality of signals for reaching safety that guides 
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attention and not a specific feature of instrumental safety signals only.   
Experiment 3 
Participants. 
Twenty-seven volunteers (24 women; M = 22 years; SD = 7 years) at the University of 
Reading and were paid £5 for participating in the study.  All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the purpose of the experiment.  The study was 
approved to be in line with the guidelines of the University of Reading Research Ethics (Protocol 
2013-173-JV).  Data collection was finished when the exams period started.  
Apparatus, Materials, and Procedure. 
The experiment remained the same as Experiment 2 except for the following changes: 
Most importantly, participants were instructed to react to the threat patch in the secondary task in 
order to lower the presentation rate of the sounds.  As in the previous experiments, in reality but 
unbeknownst to the participants, the reactions did not have this effect.  As comparison stimuli, 
we used again a signal requiring motor reactions without leading to any consequences and a 
signal indicating the absence of threat (CS-).  This time, the experimenter repeated the 
instructions to make sure participants did pick up all information.  Participants practiced the 
tasks again in 21 trials of practice phases.  During these practice trials, the threat patch was 
presented six times, four times followed by an aversive noise.  We presented non-instrumental 
safety patches, action patches, and filler stimuli five times each on the remaining practice trials.  
After the task, participants were only asked for the instrumental threat patch and not for the 
action patch how motivated they were to respond after it (1 = not at all to 7 = very much) and to 
what extent they had the impression they could influence the presentation of the sounds by 
reacting to it (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).   
Results 
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Manipulation checks and secondary task. 
 Participants described the noise as threatening (M = 5.00, SD = 1.39), unpleasant (M = 
5.89, SD = 1.22), and uncontrollable (M = 2.96, SD = 1.53).  They reported to have expected the 
presentation of the noise after the appearance of a threat patch (M = 5.26, SD = 1.02) but not af-
ter action or non-instrumental safety patch (Maction = 1.37, SDaction = 1.04; Mnon-instrumental safety = 
1.33, SDnon-instrumental safety = 0.62; ts (26) > 17.00, ps < .001); they reported that they were afraid 
during the presentation of threat patches (M = 4.74, SD = 1.16) but not during the presentation of 
action or non-instrumental safety patches (Maction = 1.52, SDaction = 0.89; Mnon-instrumental safety = 
1.56, SDnon-instrumental safety = 1.05; ts (26) > 14.45, ps < .001).  Expectancy and fear ratings did not 
differ significantly between non-instrumental and instrumental safety patches, ts (26) < 0.183, ps 
> .856.  Finally, participants reported to have been very motivated to respond after the instru-
mental threat patch (M = 5.70, SD = 1.24).  They reported to having had a moderate impression 
that reactions to the instrumental threat patch would lower the presentations of noise (M = 3.96, 
SD = 1.72).  
Participants made errors on 1.49% of trials in the secondary task.  They did not make sig-
nificantly more errors (i.e., non-reactions) after action patches (M = 0.93%, SD = 2.11%) com-
pared to instrumental threat patches (M = 0.31%, SD = 1.11%), t(26) = 1.69, p = .103.  The aver-
age STAI trait score was 42.37 (SD = 9.08).  
Dot probe task. 
 The same analyses as for Experiments 1 and 2 were performed.  Trials with errors were 
removed (3.55%).  Mean latencies and standard deviations of dot probe task responses can be 
found in Table 1.  On trials comparing the threat signal to the non-instrumental safety signal, the 
analyses revealed a main effect of threat congruence, F(1, 26) = 57.16, p < .001, d = 1.46, 95% 
CI [0.86, 2.06].  The analysis on trials with the mere action signal and the non-instrumental 
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safety signal showed a significant main effect of action relevance, F(1, 26) = 10.22, p < .005, d = 
0.61, 95% CI [0.06, 1.16].  Most importantly, attention is biased towards threat on trials 
comparing the instrumental threat signal to action signals, main effect of threat congruence, F(1, 
26) = 16.76, p < .001, d = 0.79, 95% CI [0.24, 1.34].  Hence, when actions towards threat 
patches are instrumental in reaching safety in the secondary task, threat signals gain attentional 
priority both over non-instrumental safety and action signals.  
General Discussion 
It has long been suggested that attentional processes play a crucial role in defensive reac-
tions to threat (LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), with predominant accounts arguing that 
imminent danger tunes attention towards threat.  Our findings suggest that attention in the pres-
ence of threat is biased towards both threat and safety signals.  Crucially, the signals that are 
most instrumental in reaching safety are prioritized over less useful signals suggesting that in-
strumentality for reaching safety is guiding attention under threat.  
Our results lend support to motivational models of emotional attention (Pessoa & 
Adolphs, 2010; Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen, 2013; Vogt et al., 2013; Vromen, 
Lipp, & Remington, 2015).  According to these accounts, attention is not only biased towards 
emotional events per se but also towards events that become only temporarily motivationally rel-
evant such as means to fight or avoid threat in the present study.  In threatening situations, the 
goal to reach safety is activated (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Roseman et al., 1994).  From a goal 
perspective, people should attend to both obstacles (i.e. threat) that need to be overcome to reach 
safety as well as to means that are helpful in reaching safety.  This highlights that previous stud-
ies might have shown just one consequence of experiencing threat, which is that people become 
more attentive to threat.  In line with previous studies, we observed that threat attracts attention 
when presented against non-instrumental safety signals in Experiment 1.  From a motivational 
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perspective, this is adaptive because it allows people to monitor and prepare for threat.  Im-
portantly, the present results show that instrumentality in reaching safety determines whether 
threatening or safety stimuli gain motivational and attentional priority.  That is, instrumental 
safety and threat cues were prioritized over less instrumental safety and threat cues. Interestingly, 
we observed these patterns of selective attention towards cues that only matched the color of the 
instrumental safety signals but that were not instrumental when attention was measured.  
Our conclusions are based on the various control signals that we implemented.  These 
comparison stimuli allow us to rule out that our results are driven by mere associations with 
safety or the mere action-relevance of such signals (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002).  For instance, 
if the fact that instrumental safety signals are associated with the absence of threat (i.e., safety) 
would drive attention we should not find a difference between non-instrumental safety signals 
and instrumental safety signals because both signal the absence of threat and both were evaluated 
as non-threatening.  Relatedly, although our results in Experiment 3 confirm that action signals 
guide the allocation of attention we can rule out that action relevance by itself is responsible for 
the attentional prioritization of instrumental signals because attention prioritized instrumental 
safety cues over mere action signals.  Further, threat signals were only prioritized over mere 
action signals when they were instrumental in reaching safety (Experiment 3) but not when they 
were non-instrumental (Experiment 2).  This adds to previous findings (Notebaert et al., 2012) 
demonstrating that instrumental and action-relevant stimuli associated with pain cause greater 
attentional prioritization than action-relevant but non-instrumental stimuli associated with pain.  
This shows that the functional value of instrumental safety signals for the goal of reaching safety 
guides attention and not their action relevance.  Finally, other evidence suggests that attention to 
threat is enhanced when threat is controllable (Brandstätter, Voss, & Rothermund, 2004).  
However, because threat was (presumably) controllable in all our experiments, this cannot 
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explain that attentional processes prioritized instrumental threat signals as observed in our final 
experiment.  
Our results are also in keeping with accounts suggesting that events with a high motiva-
tional value such as events that are or have been linked to a monetary reward gain attentional 
priority (e.g., Della Libera, & Chelazzi, 2009; Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Vogt, De Houwer, & 
Crombex, 2011). Importantly, our findings extend those findings by showing that events with 
high motivational value are prioritized over threatening events (cf. Correll et al., 2014; Vogt et 
al., 2013).  Further, whereas previous studies have used monetary rewards to induce high motiva-
tional value, our study reveals that instrumentality for reaching safety has high motivational val-
ue by itself and subsequently guides attention under threat.  By this, our findings shed light on 
the motivational priorities and motivational strategies that are activated when coping with threat 
and that guide attention.  
Several questions remain with regard to the generalization of our findings to real-life 
threatening situations.  Importantly, our approach does not speak to the question whether threat is 
detected in a stimulus-driven way when first encountering it.  This means, the present data do not 
address the question whether people automatically allocate attention to an unexpected threat (e.g. 
a snake in the grass).  Our account explores how attention is deployed when knowing threat is 
present.  Further, it needs to be acknowledged that, in real-life situations, the most instrumental 
signal for reaching safety when fighting threat can change quickly across time and contexts.  
Whether threat or safety signals are more instrumental in reaching safety is therefore likely to 
fluctuate.  For instance, attention to a weapon might be most instrumental when having to act 
towards it (e.g. grab it).  However, when the weapon is in one’s hands it seems more instrumen-
tal to monitor the attacker (i.e. the threat) in order to know when and how to use the weapon.  
Relatedly, when first encountering threat, attention should be deployed to the threat to identify it 
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and come up with a judgement of what to do.  This shows that it is probably the instrumentality 
of monitoring threat or safety signals that determines the attentional focus rather than the instru-
mentality of the stimulus itself.    
Further, in our studies, the instrumental value of the different signals was clear and it was 
obvious to participants that they are most instrumental.  We implemented such a design because 
it allowed us to test the basic principle that we are suggesting without individual differences in 
the perception of instrumentality biasing the results.  However, in real life situations, a subjective 
judgment of instrumentality determines the instrumental value of (monitoring) both threat and 
instrumental safety signals for reaching safety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  It might be, for in-
stance, that participants with heightened levels of anxiety show different attentional patterns per-
haps because they do perceive monitoring threat as the only and thus most instrumental way to 
cope with a threatening situation (cf. Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  Similarly, people might differ 
in their preference to fight or flight or how to fight a threat such as which weapons they would 
choose.  This highlights the importance of investigating appraisals of threat and coping possibili-
ties in relation to individual differences and particular anxiety, ideally in combination with 
measures of attention (cf. Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Notebaert, Maschelein, Wright, & Mac-
Leod, 2016).  In our data, participants indicated after the experiment that they did not believe 
that instrumental signals were instrumental in reaching safety.  However, participants very likely 
realized at this point and especially when asked to answer this question that the signal was actu-
ally not instrumental in reaching safety.  The fact that participants performed the task with very 
low error rates indicates that they pursued this goal.  Importantly, experiment 2 shows that par-
ticipants differentiate those signals even from other signals that require action (i.e., action sig-
nals) in their ratings. We would therefore recommend to gather such ratings at some point during 
the task in future research.  Finally, when weapons or escape routes are not available monitoring 
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threat is the only way of coping with it.  Hence, what is most instrumental and thus attended un-
der threat depends on the nature of the threat and how the individual can or aims to cope with it. 
Future research should address some of the limitations of the present study.  First, repli-
cating the present experiments with sub clinically or clinically anxious sample could provide im-
portant insights into coping mechanisms and related attentional patterns in anxiety.  For instance, 
in addition to displaying enhanced attention to threat, anxious participants might show weaker at-
tentional bias to instrumental safety signals.  Although we included anxiety measures here, sam-
ple sizes were too small to permit strong conclusions. Second, implementing even shorter stimu-
lus presentation times would permit a more precise insight into the exact time course of attention 
allocation.  For instance, threat monitoring and monitoring for safety might operate at different 
cognitive levels since the appraisal of instrumental safety signals is likely more complex.  Hence, 
on the basis of the current data we cannot conclude whether attention might initially have only 
been allocated to signals of threat.  In that sense, the current data might reflect attentional 
maintenance but not attentional orienting.  However, it is important to note that we still find at-
tention to threat signals on trials comparing threat signals to non-instrumental safety signals.  
This allows us to conclude that it is the comparison stimulus that drives the effect on trials com-
paring threat to instrumental safety signals (i.e., the presence of an instrumental safety signal) 
because threat signals grab attention in its absence.   
In sum, three experiments show that the signals that are most instrumental in reaching 
safety receive attentional priority.  This suggests that the motivation to reach safety guides the al-
location of attention when encountering threat.  
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Footnotes 
1 
None of the conclusions reported for all experiments were changed when using means of 
reaction times after deleting reaction times shorter than 100 ms and longer than 1000 ms. 
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Table 1 
Mean RTs and Standard Deviations (in ms) as a Function of Trial Type and Congruence in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
 
 
 
                   Congruent
a
 
 
                       Incongruent
b
 
                   
                     ABI
c
 
Trial type  M SD M SD M SD 
 
Experiment 1 
Threat vs. non-instrumental safety 399 92 418 106 19 30 
Instrumental safety vs. non-
instrumental safety 
391 105 437 137 46 56 
Instrumental safety vs. threat  396 104 431 132 35 37 
Experiment 2 
Threat vs. action 366 70 361 65 -6 32 
Instrumental safety vs. threat 353 71 378 76 25 27 
Instrumental safety vs. action  347 62 376 61 29 24 
Experiment 3 
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Action vs. non-instrumental safety 443 74 492 129 49 80 
Threat vs. non-instrumental safety 432 93 488 94 56 38 
Threat vs. action 445 88 477 89 32 41 
Note. 
a
Congruent refers to trials in which the probe replaced the picture category first mentioned under trial type.   
b
Incongruent refers to trials in which the probe replaced the picture category mentioned second under trial type.   
c
Attentional bias indices (ABI) were calculated by subtracting RTs on congruent trials from RTs on incongruent trials. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1.  Schematic overview of a trial of the combined dot probe and secondary task.  The first 
three boxes depict the dot probe task in which the presentation of two color patches was followed 
by a probe (black square) which had to be localized.  The last two boxes display the secondary 
task in which the presentation of a single stimulus was followed by the appearance of a question 
mark.  Participants had to react to the question mark by pressing the spacebar when the single 
stimulus presented had been the instrumental safety signal (Experiment 1 and 2), the action 
signal (Experiment 2 and 3), and/or the instrumental threat signal (Experiment 3).   
 
Figure 2. Attentional bias indices for the different trials in Experiments 1, 2, and 3.  Attentional 
bias indices were calculated by subtracting mean RTs of trials congruent to the category of cues 
mentioned first for each trial type from mean RTs of trials incongruent to the category of cues 
mentioned first for each trial type.  Positive attentional bias scores indicate attention towards the 
category of cues mentioned first for each trial type, negative indices indicate attention towards 
the category of cues mentioned second for each trial type.  Error bars indicate standard errors.
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Figure 2. 
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